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Abstract
Purpose – This paper aims to analyze the underlying factors of contract renewals in business-to-business
(B2B) contracts.
Design/methodology/approach – The authors build a unique data set with 296 contracts signed
between a major firm supplying petrochemical goods and its 128 customers between 2013 and 2016. They use
Insider Econometrics as their methodological approach.
Findings – The econometric results suggest that contracts involving higher volume of trade, higher levels
of dedicated assets representing seller’s specific investments in each transaction, and contracts comprising
more than one product present an increased likelihood of being renewed.
Research limitations/implications – Although limited to a single organization, this paper contributes
to management theories focused on buyer–supplier relationships in which coordination between
interdependent parties is required.
Practical implications – Practitioners engaged in B2B relationships may benefit from the findings to
shape their bargaining strategies in contexts of high levels of asset specificity and bilateral dependence.
Originality/value – This paper contribute to theories related to the strategic negotiation between
buyers and suppliers by emphasizing the importance of asset specificity in a nuanced and multifaceted
fashion, by highlighting aspects related to resource dependency, and idiosyncratic characteristics on
contract renewal.
Keywords Transaction costs, Buyer–supplier relationships, B2B contracts, Contracts renewal
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
Understanding the underlying factors of contract renewal between buyers and suppliers in
business-to-business (B2B) settings is crucial for the contracting parties. Indeed,
organizations have been setting their sights on supply-chain features to craft value-creating
strategies and deal not only with the bargain procedures but also with the extant monitoring
costs in buyer–supplier relationships.
On the one hand, renewing a B2B contract is typically considered as a success
indicator from the supplier side, as oftentimes the buyer side decides for the continuity, or
not, of the relationship. Identifying the features that increase the probability of contract
renewal is essential to define the supplier’s long-range planning specially in capital-
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intensive industries. On the other hand, from the buyer side, contract renewal may be
desirable when keeping the supplier implies in lower operational hazards and superior
efficiency standards.
The existing literature in the management and economics fields suggests that some
contingencies may affect power and bargain asymmetries of the parties involved in contract
renegotiations (Arino & Reuer, 2004). Suppliers may benefit when the goods or services are
short in supply and/or in the presence of resource (Hillman et al., 2009). Changes in
organization’s external environment, such as exogenous shocks affecting the availability of
products, are prone to influence the supply chain stability, thus shaping the willingness to
pay for goods and services and influencing the dynamics of contract renewal (Blalock &
Veloso, 2007). Equally, the literature emphasizes the importance of the characteristics of
both buyers and suppliers to determine contract renewal when specific investments are at
stake(Chong et al., 2015; Crocker &Masten, 1996).
However, the strategy literature still does not offer many evidences on the determinants
of contract renewal in B2B settings. In this paper, we assess the factors affecting the
dynamics of contract renewal in buyer–supplier relationships in the manufacturing realm.
We take into account the characteristics of buyers (or customers) and the characteristics of
the contractual relationship between these buyers and a major supplier (or seller), thus
enabling us to identify which aspects contribute to the increase (or decrease) of contract
renewal.
For that, we performed several analyses with a hand-crafted and unique database
containing 296 contracts (with an average term of 5 years) signed between 128 buyers and a
major supplier of utility services in Brazil between 2013 and 2016. Our primary sources from
organization’s internal micro data enable us to understand some organizational phenomena
not easily observed by external actors. The data we use in our paper are not available in
public sources due to confidentiality reasons. Our approach has recently coined under the
“insider econometrics” tradition, which has been used not only in economics but also in
management research (Ann et al., 2004; Teodorovicz et al., 2019).
Overall, our econometric analysis suggests that higher trade volumes involved in the
transaction are associated to an increase in the probability of renewing a contract. In this
case, contracting parties involved in a situation of bilateral dependency may benefit from
existing economies of scale present in the contractual relationship. Similarly, the existence of
a greater variety of products transacted between the parties (economics of scope) increases
the odds of contract renewal. In addition, we demonstrate that the presence of asset
specificity (dedicated assets) contributes to increase the probability of renewing a B2B
contract in capital-intensive industries. In our context, this occurs when the supplier is the
closest supplier, regardless of the geographic distance. By unveiling these patterns, our
paper contributes to management theories related to buyer-supplier relationships within a
strategic perspective (Lumineau & Henderson, 2012), notably within a context of
investments with high asset specificity levels (Henry Xie et al., 2010; Hoskisson et al., 2018),
in which coordination between interdependent parties is required (Oliveira & Lumineau,
2017). In addition, practitioners engaged in B2B relationships may benefit from our findings
to shape their bargaining strategies.
Contract renewal in business-to-business relationships
Within a B2B relationship, where a firm supplies goods or services to other firm, the use
of contracts to design, adjust, measure or monitor the interactions is a standard practice
in settings containing transaction costs and resource dependency (Hillman et al., 2009).




execution stages along with external contingencies tend to shape organizational
performance.
On the one hand, the purpose of B2B contracts is to avoid price volatility and preserve
the parties involved. On the other hand, contracts foresee the required volumes to be
traded so as the corresponding prices. In resource-dependency settings, suppliers rely on
orders from buyers, whereas buyers depend on the supply of the products produced by
the supplier to fulfill a given task. In this matter, power asymmetries present in the
contractual relationships are likely to shape contractual performance (Casciaro &
Piskorski, 2005).
Contracts play a leading role in protecting suppliers embedded in industries
characterized by economies of scale and scope. Contracts are particularly important to
assure supply-chain stability and reduce the volatility that may arise from competitors’
actions. Safeguards are even more necessary in the presence of high levels of asset
specificity (Williamson, 1991). To preserve efficiency from economies of scale and scope, the
continuity of contracts, that is, their renewal at the initially foreseen termination date is a
key for maintaining production and trade volumes, hence influencing supply costs and
financial performance for both contracting parties.
Although contracts may preserve parties from the hazards of the external environment,
the continuity of the exchange is not taken for granted, regardless of the existing
perceptions or proven evidence of positive and adequate contractual performance.
Oftentimes, contracting parties revisit contractual clauses to align transaction attributes
with the competitive landscape, with other external contingencies, or just appropriate more
value from the focused transaction. Nevertheless, bilateral dependency resulting from
transaction-specific investments restricts alternative uses of the assets and may refrain an
opportunistic behavior (Williamson, 1991). If on the one hand the lack of alternative
suppliers (or buyers) imposed by specific investments is likely to stimulate contract renewal;
on the on the other hand, existing asymmetries between the exchanging parties may create
tensions in the presence of specific assets. Buyers, for instance, can be in a position to coerce
suppliers to obtain discounts or more favorable delivery conditions, impose their preferences
and capture more value from idiosyncratic investments to the contractual relationships
involving specific investments, which are common in B2B settings (Moraes Antiqueira et al.,
2007). Locational specificities along with physical and human assets are also sources of
conflict andmay potentially engender transaction costs in B2B supply chains (Cabral, 2004).
In parallel, some studies in the industrial marketing field highlight the role of buyer’s
loyalty and their propensity to extend contractual relationships (Cooil et al., 2007). Buyers
take into account satisfaction, value creation, relationship quality and service/product
quality explanations in their decisions to continue a contract relationship, whereas sellers
posit financial performance and competitive advantage resulting from transaction
continuity as main drivers of contract renewal (Williams et al., 2011). Figure 1 highlights
such cost-benefit reasoning in the decision of extending contractual relationships in B2B
settings.
In the next section, we provide some testable hypotheses relating features of contractual
relationships and the propensity to renew contracts in B2B settings.
Hypotheses
As mentioned before, we assess how buyer’s features and characteristics of the buyer–
supplier relationships affect contract renewal. Although our approach dialogues with recent
literature on interorganizational relations (Lumineau, 2017), we do not explore relational and





Although relevant, exploring control mechanisms and the behavioral aspects that shape
trust and collaboration are not in our scope in this work.
Buyer–supplier relationship intensity
In addition to asset specificity and uncertainty, frequency is widely recognized as a major
transaction attribute (Williamson, 1991). More frequent transactions are likely to affect cost
structures in both buyer and supplier sides and determine trade volumes, thus influencing
the odds of contract renewal.
Further, more intense and frequent relationships may imply in additional gains from
mutual learning when repeated interactions enable contractual adjustments, fixing errors
and the reinforcement of positive behaviors, adequate practices and at the end, the
deployment of transaction-specific competencies that are able to engender value creation
(Argyres et al., 2012). Interrupting such a virtuous circle might not be appropriate.
Therefore, the intensity of buyer–supplier relationships assumes strategic relevance as
breaching the contract and stopping the relationship can not only destroy value but also
transfer the surplus generated by frequent and intense buyer–supplier relationships to
competitors. Formally:
H1. The higher are the buyer–supplier interactions, the higher the likelihood of
renewing contracts in B2B relationships.
The role of asset specificity
Specific assets, or those that are not likely to be redeployed without value destruction, are
one of the key dimensions to understand the magnitude of transaction costs in buyer–












Transaction-cost theory posit that when keeping frequency and uncertainty constant, the
higher the asset specificity degree and the lower the odds of using market mechanisms to
govern buyer–supplier relationships. In extreme cases, vertical integration is the most
efficient solution, i.e. the governance structure that reduces the existing transaction costs
(Williamson, 1991. In some settings, managers may invoke contracts that foresee
obligations and rules to share property and decision rights, which allows contracting
parties to craft long-term contracts even in the presence of high asset specificity (Menard,
2013).
As defined by Williamson (1991), asset specificity presents some distinctions: site
specificity, that is, the proximity between buyers and supplier can affect inventory and
transportation costs and may impose replacement costs; physical asset specificity, when it
involves specialized equipment to produce components at proper cost levels; human-asset
specificity, which surges from continuous learning frommanagerial practices; and dedicated
assets, which represent investments on behalf of particular suppliers and/or buyers and that
specific to the relationship. All these aspects impose bilateral dependency and make for
difficult (and costly) the interruption of a given transaction.
Commodity suppliers with production cost similar to the competition may depend on the
relative location vis-à-vis buyers’ location to achieve their objectives and fulfill customer
needs. Therefore, the site specificity is a source of competitive advantage, and it plays a
leading role in the odds of renewing ongoing contracts. Lower distribution and logistics
costs compared to competition tend to offer more affordable prices and create enhanced
value perception.
Therefore:
H2. The presence of site specificity, i.e. the supplier’s relative location compared to other
alternatives available to buyers, is likely to increase the odds of contract renewal in
B2B relationships.
Supplier’s location may also contribute to the increased efficiency in logistics and
distribution resources, i.e. customers located near are likely to use transportation specific
assets, such as pipes, not available to other customers and experience cost advantages due
to the reduced costs per transported unit. In this scenario, buyers may benefit from
increased trade volumes. Hence, efficiency aspects arising from location decisions are
correlated to value perception. Lower buyer–supplier distances shape costs influence the
deployment of specific assets, especially those used in transport, and facilitate buyer–
supplier coordination.
Therefore:
H3: The lower the distance between buyer and s supplier, the higher the odds of
contract renewal in B2B relationships.
Economies of scope
Economies of scope occur when supplying more than one product to the same customer
engender positive impacts to exchanging parties compared to supplying a single product
in isolation. Indeed, after sharing supply sources, production structures, resources,
capabilities and distribution channels, organizations may obtain lower costs when they
produce/distribute more products (Chandler, 1977). Not surprisingly, manufacturing





procedures to decrease costs, increase flexibility and obtain superior levels of competitive
advantage.
Suppliers focused on obtaining economies of scope tend to present an increased
perception of the value created, which, in addition to the underlying costs of switching
suppliers, and inherent asset specificity levels may stimulate buyers to continue contractual
relationships. In this vein, learning and economies of scope arising from specialization and
appropriation of idiosyncratic rents by contracting parties not only help organizations to
develop dynamic capabilities (Augier & Teece, 2009) but are also likely to explain the
continuity of buyer–supplier relationships over time. Therefore:
H4. The presence of economics of scope, both to buyer and supplier, increases the odds
of contract renewal in B2B relationships.
Methodology
Data
To analyze the underlying reasons to renew B2B contracts, we contacted a leading
multinational company operating in the chemical industry, which supplies industrial
utilities. The organization is present in Brazil for more than 40 years. Their main
competitors are multinational companies with global coverage. Rivalry standards in the
industry are based on operation efficiency, technical reliability and strong financial
performance. The company focuses on B2B, i.e. their customers are other companies of
several fields using the acquired products in their operations.
We have built a unique data set with features of buyers which renewed or not their supply
contracts at the end of the term of the contract. We have information of 296 contracts signed
between the observed company and their 128 buyers between 2013 and 2016, which
corresponds to all contracts in the period. Our empirical strategy allows us to build an
exclusive database enabling us to observe organizational phenomena that are difficult to
observe by a database publicly available. The analytical consistency of our econometric
procedures allows to use our research strategy in the approach known as “insider
econometrics” (Teodorovicz et al., 2019). This tradition is relatively new and has been gaining
supporters in the fields of economics (Ann et al., 2004), management (Frank & Obloj, 2014)
and public administration (Cabral & Lazzarini, 2015).
Table I shows the distribution of buyers according to the manufacturing segment.
Dedicated assets with low or any interchangeability with other industries characterize
the industry in which the supplier operates. One may observe constant investments in
specific knowledge areas to improve technological capabilities and obtain advantages from
superior products or differentiated service levels. Along these lines, products transportation
is performed through highly specific assets (such as tank trucks, tank cars and cryogenic
equipment). This involves specific investments in proper storage devices within buyer’s
facilities, which are often incurred by the supplier side.
The existing specificity levels require expressive investments in assets that are not easily
tradable. This hampers liquidity, increases complexity in the investment analysis and the
perception of superior risks involved. Renewing contracts is particularly critical for the
supplier perspective to safeguard the investment made in a setting in which outside options
are not vast. Assuring trade volumes to obtain production efficiency is crucial to
organizational performance.





Our intention is to determine the characteristics that increase the odds of renewing supply
contracts in B2B settings. Our dependent variable (“Renov”) refers to the event of renewing
or not the observed contract, thus assuming one (1) when the renewal occurred and zero (0)
otherwise, when the contract was not renovated.
To estimate the probability of renewing B2B contracts, we use logit models with
maximum likelihood, which is a widely used econometric procedure to deal with discrete
choices.
Independent variables
To test our first hypothesis, we observe the volume in kilograms (identified as “Vol”) as our
measure of buyer–supplier relationship intensity. We expect that the higher the trade
volumes the higher is the relationship intensity. Higher trade volumes may be associated
with increased buyer dependency on suppliers.
For our second hypothesis, we create a variable (EmpMA), assuming the value of one (1)
for the cases in which the supplier company is the better option from the logistics point of
view. That is, the supplier company is the buyer’s closest supplier vis-à-vis other potential
suppliers. To obtain this variable, we performed a comprehensive assessment of all
competitors’ facilities and checked the distance (in Km) between the observed competitors’
facilities and the buyer operating units.We used Google Maps to support our calculation.
In our third hypothesis, we calculate the distance (Distan) between the supplier and the
observed buyer company, measured in kilometers.
To assess our fourth hypothesis, we created a variable (AdProd) assuming one (1) when
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refers to a single item. It is worth to emphasize that the supplier does not necessarily
demand for more than one product all the time.
To improve the consistency of our analyses and reduce the role of unobservable factors,
we also use year controls, to assess the incidence of exogenous effects such as
macroeconomic factors. Such unobservable may affect the propensity of renewing B2B
contracts.
Table III shows our descriptive statistics for each variable.
Table IV shows a summary associating variables and hypotheses to be tested, including
the expected sign for the probability to renew a contract. Table V presents the correlation
matrix. Wemay note the lack of multicollinearity issues in our variables.
Results and discussion
Table VI shows the results of our logit regressions. It is worth to emphasize that, except for
the distance rate, all other variables were statically significant at 1 per cent, either including
year fixed-effects or not. Columns (7) and (8) exhibit models with all variables.
Our analysis suggests that the distance between the observed supplier and its customers
is not associated to contract renewal (see columns (3) and (4) and more complete regressions
columns (7) and (8)). The variable Log_Vol is relevant and has a positive impact on contract
renewal, that is, the higher the trade volumes, the higher is the probability that its contract is
renewed at the end of the contractual period, both in simple regressions and multiple
regressions. The variable dProd is also relevant and has a positive impact, confirming that
the existence of more than one product supplied to the same buyer increases the probability
of renewing contracts. The variable EmpMA shows that the supplier company closest to the
observed buyer plays a major role on probability of renewing contracts.
Wald tests evaluate the robustness and the significance of all coefficients in the logistic
regression. For the Models (3) and (4), the parameters were not significant and suggest that
variable Distan is not relevant to estimate the probability to renew a contract in isolation.
Such finding is reinforced by the lower values of pseudo R2 associated to the Models (3) and
(4), as well as the models in which Wald statistics were not statistically significant.
However, the higher pseudo R2 are associated to the Models (9) and (10), which include all
interested explanatory rates. These results along with the Wald statistics (p< 0.01) suggest
that our variables present explanatory power and are valid to predict the observed effect.
Although they are useful to understand the sign of the coefficients, the results of
Table VI do not allow to assess the magnitude of the effects. Table VII presents the results
of the logit regressions with odds ratio coefficients, which indicate the likelihood to renew a
contract vis-à-vis the odds of not renewing a contract.
Considering the results present in Column (8), each additional product supplied increases
the odds to renew a contract in three times. On the contrary, in case the supplier company is
the best alternative, the odds to renew the contract are twice bigger than when the observed
supplier is not the best alternative from the logistic point of view.
We also plot additional graphs containing marginal effects to assess the effect of trade
volume (log_Vol) on the propensity to renew a given contract. The probability to renew a
contract increases according to the relationship intensity, indicated by the volume
transacted in kilograms per year. Figure 2 demonstrates that the probability to renew a
contract is accentuated when relationship intensity increases (see the “S” format in the
marginal effect curve). For example, when the renewal odds are 13 per cent, trade volumes
needs to increase much more than 300 per cent to increase the odds of renewal to 26 per cent.






























































































































































































































































































































































































make the probability of renewal to be 80 per cent. Similar results are observed in Figure 3, in
which we use Volume instead of Log_Vol.
For EmpMA and AdProd variables, marginal effects are presented in Table VIII. The
average probability to renew a contract increases 20 p.p. when the supplier is the best
alternative in terms of distance. An additional product increases the probability to renew a
contract in 25 p.p. on average.
Table IX summarizes the results of the tests we have performed. It shows that the model
logit classified correctly 67.23 per cent of the cases we have observed. There were 42 correct
classifications to renew a contract, that is, 38.53 per cent of the contracts renewed were
classified correctly and 83.95 per cent of the contracts not renovated were classified
correctly.
These analyses allow us to elaborate some considerations regarding our hypotheses
previously drawn. Our first hypothesis posits that the intensity of buyer–supplier
relationships, the higher the odds of renewing a B2B contract. We measured the relationship
intensity through a volume effectively transacted in the years observed until the year of the
renewal. We observed in Table VI (Model 8) that this hypothesis was not rejected (Log_Vol
is significant at p < 0.01). Higher degrees of asset specificity in this industry, in terms of
production, transportation and storage seem to justify the high dependency of the customer
to higher trade volumes transacted in line with the tenets of resource dependency theory of
dependency (Hillman et al., 2009). In cases of intense buyer–supplier relationship not
renewing a contract would imply in superior transaction costs due to the costs associated to
supplier replacement. On the supplier side, the alternative of getting new contracts with




Renov log Vol Volume Distan EmpMA AdProd
Renov 1.000
log Vol 0.286 1.000
Volume 0.286 1.000 1.000
Distan 0.010 0.052 0.052 1.000
EmpMA 0.167 0.228 0.228 0.619 1.000





Variable Description Type Hypothesis Expected sign





Identifies if the observed supplier
is the closest supplier to the buyer
company, compared to competitors
Discrete H2 þ





Identifies if the observed contract
involves more than one product
Discrete H4 þ













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































performing-specific investments crafting contracts to be created and potential learning costs
arising from new relationships. These extra costs can imply in lower odds to renew such
contracts in the future. On the buyer side, the transaction costs involved in replacing
suppliers are also non negligible as they involve the creation of new contracts, in addition to
lower odds of reaping benefits from relational ties accumulated through repeated
interactions over time (Lumineau & Henderson, 2012; Oliveira & Lumineau, 2017).
Our second hypothesis (H2) was not rejected either. Model (8) in Table VI suggests that
the buyer is in regions where the supplier is the most suitable option from the logistic
perspective, then the odds of renewing contracts are significantly higher (p < 0.05).
According to our analyses, it is twice more likely that a contract is renewed when the













the asset specificity dimension (Williamson, 1991), we suggest that dedicated assets are
important vectors in the dynamics of contractual renewal. Both suppliers and buyers are
benefited from this condition and they try to exploit it by extending the relationships,
especially due to the preservation of advantages from contracts relational ties in supply
chains (Lumineau &Henderson, 2012; Poppo et al., 2016).
On the contrary, our third hypothesis (H3), related to buyer–supplier distance, was
not supported considering that the distance is not significant (p> 0.1) to involve
contract renewing. This result suggests a nuanced view on role of asset specificity in
buyer–supplier relationships compared to prior studies in strategy (Dyer, 1997; Poppo
et al., 2016). Indeed, the location issue, as tested by the hypothesis above, is not the sole
reason for contract renewal. It is necessary to observe the relative location between
buyers and suppliers in an interdependent fashion. In our case, even if the distances are
reduced, supplier tends to be in disadvantage if their competitors are even closer to
buyers.
Finally, H4 was not rejected in our study, as evidenced by the AdProd variable, (p <
0.01). Buyers with contracts involving more than one product with the supplier herein
analyzed tend to experience a significant probability to renew contracts. This occurs due
to economies of scope. In addition, the transaction costs tend to be lower in this scenario.
On the supplier side, economies of scope allow value appropriation through
complementary products and services. On the buyer side a similar situation occurs, thus
enabling a value-creating arrangement in which the parties have incentives to preserve. It
is also worth to emphasize that resource dependency may also explain the propensity of
enlarging the horizontal scope of the contractual relationship through the acquisition of
additional products (Hillman et al., 2009). For example, when a buyer demands certain
products in small volumes and competitors are not necessarily interested to supply,
whether due to costs inefficiencies or the mere unavailability of the product in that






Prob(Renov) Standard errors Confidence interval
EmpMA
0 0.338 0.0312 0.277 0.399
1 0.515 0.0824 0.354 0.676
AdProd
0 0.328 0.0307 0.268 0.388
1 0.571 0.0701 0.434 0.708






Classified Renov = 1 Renov = 0 Total
Renov = 1 42 30 72
Renov = 0 67 157 224





This paper aims to analyze three potentially relevant factors in the decision of renewing B2B
contracts, the relationship intensity between buyer and supplier, site specificity resulting
from the relative location of buyers and suppliers and the role of economies of scope. By
focusing on buyer–supplier relationships in B2B settings, we contributed to theories related
to the strategic negotiation between buyers and suppliers (Lumineau & Henderson, 2012;
Oliveira & Lumineau, 2017) by emphasizing the importance of asset specificity in a nuanced
and multifaceted fashion (Poppo et al., 2016; Williamson, 1991), aspects related to resource
dependency (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Hillman et al., 2009) and idiosyncratic
characteristics related to the dynamics of contract renewal (Cooil et al., 2007). Our paper also
dialogues with theories focused on trust aspects in buyer–supplier relationships in a supply
chain management context (Zhang &Huo, 2013).
Implications for practice are evident. Managers involved in buyer–supplier negotiations
may use the bargaining drivers we have identified to enable value creation and
appropriation especially in settings involving high degree of asset specificity and high
traded volumes. Under the supplier perspective, management practices analytically
structured through the findings of our paper may contribute for enhanced strategies
oriented to contract renewal. Managers may observe the boundary conditions for contract
renewal that we have identified in this project and craft the appropriated actions.
Recognizing the importance of locational aspects involved in buyer–supplier relationships
and their interdependent facets may also help buyers and sellers in the decision-making
process. Site-specific investments are crucial to assure buyer’ loyalty and obtain long-term
relationships. Suppliers can also compensate a less favorable location by offering additional
products. As already discussed, economies of scope also play a leading role in the dynamics
of contract renewal.
Naturally, our paper has a strong caveat as it is limited to a single organization and its
suppliers and this fact may thwart the generalizability of our findings. Expanding our study
by including additional firms from the same industry and perhaps from other industries is a
possible venue of future research for those interested in the topic. Future studies can refute
or corroborate our hypothesis and build new theoretical propositions on contract renewal. In
this vein, aspects related to issues connected to trust may be tackled by future studies
interested to analyze this phenomena under the lenses of interorganizational relationships
literature (Lumineau, 2017; Lumineau & Henderson, 2012). In addition, future studies may
analyze the determinants of contractual performance due to the contract renewal, as well as
to explore the role of asset specificity by using measures that reflect real investments
performed by contracting parties. Although such factors are difficult to obtain due to
confidentiality aspects, even in studies using the insider econometrics approach, there is an
immense potential to explore contract renewal drivers through solid identification strategies
that allow causal inferences between the variables of interest.
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